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EDMONSON v. LEESVILLE CONCRETE CO.:
STATE ACTION OR INACTION
- DOES IT MATTER?1
INTRODUCTION
Prior to Batson v. Kentucky a prosecutor could exclude prospective
black jurors for racial reasons if the prosecutor did not make a habit of
it? However, in Batson, the Supreme Court held that the exclusion of pro-
spective jurors solely on the basis of race violated the equal protection
clause.' Batson requires that the trial court inquire into a prosecutor's
suspect strike and deny that strike if it was racially motivated Thus,
the venerable right to peremptory challenge gave way, somewhat, to the
constitutional right of equal protection.
Several lower courts have applied Batson to a state in civil pro-
ceedings, too. Courts have limited the principal to the state because of
the state action prerequisite of the equal protection clause. However, in
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Ca,s the Fifth Circuit court of appeals
applied Batson to civil proceedings between private litigants - an
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 860 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1988).
2 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
'See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
4 Batson, 476 U.S. at 81. The Court noted that "[a] person's race simply 'is unrelated to his fitness
as a juror.' " Id. at 87 (quoting Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting)). In Batson, however, the primary issue was whether the prosecutor's exercise of peremp-
tory challenges, in a particular case, constituted purposeful racial discrimination against the black
criminal defendant. See infra notes 44-58.
' Id. at 97-100. The Court noted that a trial court may either reinstate the challenged juror or con-
duct voir dire again. Id. n.24.
'The Batson rationale, which the Edmonson court applied to civil proceedings, may be characteriz-
ed as a dichotomy between the interests of a historical procedure (peremptory challenges) and those
of a constitutional right to equal protection of the law. Although on the surface the Batson principle
seems to abridge the use of peremptory challenges, in actuality the reason given for a strike has
been usually deemed neutral. See Serr and Maney, Racism, Peremptory Challenges and the Democratic
Jury: the Jurisprudence of a Delicate Balance, 79 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1988). For a history
of peremptory challenges see Swain, 380 U.S. at 212-21.
'See Clark v. City of Bridgeport, 645 F. Supp. 890 (D. Conn. 1986). See also Patton, The Discriminatory
Use of Peremptory Challenges in Civil Litigation: Practice, Procedure and Review, 19 TEx. TECH. L.
REV. 921 (1988).
'State action is a requirement in any Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause claim. See,
eg, Davis, The Supreme Court: Finding State Action... Sometimes, 26 How. L.J. 1395 (1983). The
fourteenth amendment is applicable to the federal government through the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
' 860 F.2d at 1313.
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extension of state action no prior court had been willing to make.'0 The
fifth circuit, nevertheless, further sharpened judicial focus on the use of
peremptory challenges via the equal protection clause." But the rationale
underlying the extension of the state action doctrine from Batson to Ed-
monson is too tenuous to support the Edmonson holding.
This note first reviews the facts of Edmonson. Second, this note ex-
amines the history of judicial inquiry into the use of peremptory
challenges. Third, this note reviews the application of Batson to civil cases.
Finally, this note analyzes the extension of the state action doctrine in
Edmonson and discusses an alternative to the Edmonson approach to
state action.
FACTS
Edmonson, a black man, sued Leesville Concrete Company for
negligence.'2 Edmonson was a laborer for a road construction company.3
While at the construction site, Edmonson was caught between the back
bumper of Leesville's concrete truck and the front of a curb-and-gutter
machine' 4 As a result, he sustained injuries. 5
Edmonson brought suit in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Louisiana (Lake Charles Division).'6 In voir dire,
Leesville exercised its peremptory challenges to strike two black
veniremen." Citing Batson, Edmonson requested the district court to re-
quire Leesville to give a racially neutral reason for its challenges.!"
The district court denied the request stating as its basis that Batson, a
criminal case, did not apply to civil proceedingsP9 The case proceeded
10 The Edmonson court extended existing precedent in two significant areas: (1) state action, and
(2) the application of Batson to civil litigants. But given existing precedent, the "state action" ex-
tension was the more tenuous. See infra notes 75-103.
11 The Supreme Court first opened the door to judicial inquiry into the use of peremptories in Swain.
See infra notes 38-43. Batson opened the door further. See infra notes 51-58. Edmonson applied the
same judicial inquiry procedure employed in Batson, a criminal proceeding, to a civil proceeding.
Edmonson, 860 F.2d at 1315.
" Edmonson, 860 F.2d at 1309-10. Edmonson brought suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Id. n.2.
13 Brief for Appellant at 3, Edmonson, 860 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1988) (No. 87-4804).
14 Id.
Is Edmonson, 860 F.2d at 1309.
I6 d.
Id. at 1310.
1 Id.
19 The district court judge stated that "there is no discrimination, no violation of the law in the
selection procedure." Brief for Appellee at 6, Edmonson, 860 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1988) (No. 87-4804)
(quoting the U.S. Dist. Ct. W.D. La., Transcript, v. 3 at 61).
[Vol. 23:1
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to trial. The jury assessed Edmonson's damages at $90,000.00?. However,
the jury found Edmonson 80 percent negligent and awarded him only
$18,000.00? 1 Edmonson appealed the district court's decision to the fifth
circuit court of appeals seeking a new trial because of Leesville's alleged
discrimination?2
On appeal, the fifth circuit held that the equal protection clause
forbids a private civil litigant in federal court from using peremptory
challenges to strike prospective jurors solely on the basis of race? 3 In do-
ing so, the fifth circuit expressly extended the Batson principle?4 The court
had little trouble finding that this civil case between private litigants
involved state action?'
The court found a sufficient nexus for state action between the
private litigant's exercise of peremptory challenges and the trial judge's
involvement as a government official in that conduct?' The court reasoned
that the government is intimately involved in the peremptory process:
the government assembles the venire; 28 U.S.C. § 1870 grants the civil
litigant the right to peremptory challenges; the challenges are exercised
in a judicial setting, (operated by the government); the challenges are
not self-executing, (the trial judge must excuse the veniremen); and, the
trial judge acts in a federal court required by the Constitution to be open
to the public, whereby the public might observe the judge's toleration of
a discriminatory use of peremptory challenges? 7 The court, therefore, con-
cluded that "[t]he litigant exercises the peremptory challenge, but it is
the judge, acting in a judicial capacity, who excuses the prospective juror."28
To further support its holding, the court cited federal appellate and
district courts that have applied the Batson principle to civil cases?9
20 Edmonson, 860 F.2d at 1310.
21 Id.
22 Id.
21 Id. at 1314.
24 Id. at 1314 ("We, therefore, hold that the principle announced by the Supreme Court in Batson
applies to civil cases as well").
25 Id. at 1312-13.
21 Id. The court cited the following cases as controlling on the issue of state action: Lugar v. Ed-
mondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Tulsa Professional Col-
lection Serv. v. Pope, 108 S.Ct. 1340 (1988); and Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715
(1961).
27 Edmonson, 860 F.2d at 1312.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 1314. The court cited: Maloney v. Washington, 690 F Supp. 687 (N.D. Ill.) (mem.), vacated
on other grounds, Maloney v. Plunkett, 854 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting little difference in racial
prejudice between criminal and civil proceedings in federal court); Wilson v. Cross, 845 F.2d 163
(8th Cir. 1988) (expressing strong doubts that Batson is limited to criminal cases); and, Clark v.
City of Bridgeport, 645 F. Supp. 890 (D. Conn. 1986) (holding that Batson applies to civil proceedings
where "state action"). The court distinguished Esposito v. Buonome, 642 F. Supp. 760 (D. Conn. 1986),
which held that Batson was not controlling in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.
STATE ACTION OR INACTIONSummer, 1989]
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The court concluded that to limit Batson to criminal cases "would betray
Batson's fundamental principle: the state's use, toleration, and approval
of peremptory challenges based on race violates the equal protection
clause."0
The fifth circuit remanded the case?1 The court stated that if Ed-
monson could establish a prima facie case of discrimination, then the equal
protection clause required that the district court inquire into Leesville's
reasons for striking the two black veniremen?2 If Leesville could not give
a racially neutral reason for its challenges, then the district court would
have to order a new trial?'
The Edmonson Dissent
The Edmonson dissent disagreed that state action could be found
through the private litigant's exercise of peremptory challenges?4 The
dissent reasoned that although the government grants the use of peremp-
tory challenges, neither the private litigant nor the trial judge could be
characterized as a state actor?5 More fundamentally, however, the dis-
sent criticized the presumption in Batson, and now in Edmonson, that
the use of peremptory challenges "along ethnic lines necessarily involves
or gives the appearance of involving derogatory racial views.'" 6 Finally,
the dissent disapproved of what it deemed to be Edmonson's effect - to
abridge the traditional use of peremptory challenges?
7
BACKGROUND
Pre-Batson
In Swain v. Alabama,38 the Supreme Court held that if a black
defendant could demonstrate, over a series of cases, that a prosecutor
30 Edmonson, 860 F.2d at 1314.
31 Id. at 1315.
32 Id.
33 Id.
I Id. at 1316 (Gee, J., dissenting). The dissent cited the following cases as controlling on the issue
of state action: Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981); and, Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
" Edmonson, 860 F.2d at 1316 (Gee, J., dissenting).
3" Id. at 1316. Proponents of the unabridged use of peremptory challenges claim that "excluding
a particular cognizable group from all venire pools is stigmatizing and discriminatory in several
interrelated ways that the peremptory challenge is not,' because peremptories are applied arbitrarily.
United States v. Leslie, 783 F.2d 541, 554 (5th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added) (en banc), vacated, 479
U.S. 1074 (1987). See also Batson, 476 U.S. at 119-20 (Berger, J., dissenting).
17 Edmonson, 860 F.2d at 1317 (Gee, J., dissenting).
38 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79. In Swain, the Supreme Court
implied that race was a legitimate ground for challenge in an individual case. Swain, 380 U.S. at
221. See also United States v. Carter, 528 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976).
AKRON LAW REVIEW (Vol. 23:1
4
Akron Law Review, Vol. 23 [1990], Iss. 1, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol23/iss1/5
systematically excluded prospective black jurors through the exercise of
peremptory challenges, then the presumption that the prosecutor's strikes
were to obtain a fair and impartial jury "may well be overcome." 39 Other-
wise, the Court held, a prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges
to strike prospective black jurors did not violate the equal protection
clause0 Consequently, the Court rejected the argument that equal pro-
tection required the prosecutor to explain the reasons for his suspect use
of peremptory challenges. "Any other result.. . " the Court said, "would
establish a rule wholly at odds with the peremptory challenge system
as we know it."41 Although Swain did recognize that equal protection man-
dated a means of judicial inquiry into a prosecutor's suspect use of peremp-
tory challenges, that means proved insurmountable to a defendant claim-
ing discrimination 2 Because of this onerous burden, the Batson Court
overruled that portion of Swain and held that a black defendant may re-
ly solely on the circumstances of his/her own case to establish an equal
protection claim. 3
Batson v. Kentucky
James Batson, a black man, was indicted in Kentucky for burglary
and receiving stolen property.4 In voir dire, the prosecutor exercised his
peremptory challenges to strike all four black veniremen; an all-white
jury was selected. 45 Batson moved to discharge the jury on several
grounds.46 One ground was that the prosecutor's use of his peremptory
challenges violated the equal protection clause. The trial judge denied
the motion: 8 The jury convicted Batson and he appealed. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the trial court's decision.4s Batson
appealed to the United States Supreme Court.5
Under Batson, a defendant must establish a prima facie case of pur-
poseful discrimination?1 To establish a prima facie case, a defendant must
show that: (1) he is a member of a "cognizable racial group" and the
S Swain, 380 U.S. at 224.
• Id. at 221.
41 Id. at 222.
42 See Patton, supra note 7, at 922-23.
" Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 96.
" Id. at 82.
," Id. at 83.
46 Id.
47 Id.
" Id.
41 Id. at 84. The Supreme Court of Kentucky recently had reaffirmed its reliance on Swain. Id.
" Batson v. Kentucky, cert. granted, 471 US. 1052 (1985).
"' Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
Summer, 1989] STATE ACTION OR INACTION
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prosecutor has used peremptory challenges to strike members of that
group; and, (2) from the facts of the defendant's case, the judge might
infer that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to strike prospec-
tive jurors on the basis of race.52 The defendant may also "rely on the
fact... that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice
that permits 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate. "
If the defendant can establish a prima facie case, then the burden shifts
to the prosecutor to provide a racially neutral reason for his race-based
strikes.5' Thus, the Batson Court, relative to the Swain court, mandated
greater judicial scrutiny concerning the prosecutor's suspect use of
peremptory challenges.55
Although the primary issue in Batson was whether the prosecutor
violated the defendant's equal protection rights, the Court also recognized
the equal protection rights of prospective black jurors who might other-
wise be excluded because of their race relation to the defendant.56 Fur-
thermore, the Court noted that "[t]he harm from discriminatory jury selec-
tion extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror
to touch the entire community."57 Thus, Batson recognized both the ex-
cluded juror and the public as aggrieved parties. Arguably, the same par-
ties would be equally aggrieved if the discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges occurred in civil proceedings
8
Batson's Application to Civil Proceedings
In Clark v. City of Bridgeport9 a United States district court judge
applied the Batson principle to civil proceedings against the state for
alleged discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. The court stated
that "there simply is no reason why the equal protection analysis now
employed in Batson should not apply with equal force to" civil cases in-
volving state action. ° In Esposito v. Buonome,61 however, a judge in the
same district court refused to apply Batson to a civil case where the
52 Id. at 96.
53 Id. (quoting in part Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
Id. at 97.
See Patton, supra note 7, at 924.
5 Batson, 476 U.S. at 87. See also Chew v. State, 71 Md. App. 681, 527 A.2d 332, cert. granted, 311
Md. 301, 534 A.2d 369 (1987).
57 Batson, 476 U.S. at 87.
" See Chew, 71 Md. App. at 692-93, 527 A.2d at 337-38.
" 645 F. Supp. 890.
60 Id. at 895-96.
"1 642 F. Supp. 760 (D. Conn. 1986).
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:1
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plaintiff alleged the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.3 2 The
Esposito court reasoned that Batson's focus was to safeguard the rights
of criminal defendants who are forced into court against their will, rather
than a civil plaintiff who has chosen to initiate the judicial process. 3 The
Esposito court never reached the state action issue.
Many courts and commentators have concluded that "[s]ince the
interests of the litigants, the rights of the excluded jurors, and the in-
volvement of the public in a civil proceeding do not differ radically from
a criminal proceeding. . ., the existing differences do not automatically
justify permitting discriminatory peremptories in civil litigation.' 4 Fur-
thermore, in Chew v. State,6- a Maryland appellate court noted that the
Supreme Court implied Batson's application to civil proceedings because
the holding was based on the equal protection clause rather than the sixth
amendment, which only applies to criminal proceedings.36 The Chew court
concluded that "[tihe rule in Batson, therefore, was designed 'to serve
multiple ends ,,67 But a limit to Batson's application- judicial inquiry
into the suspect use of peremptory challenges - in civil cases is the state
action requirement of the equal protection clause.
Batson's State Action Requirement
The Batson holding was based on the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause.3s The equal protection clause applies only to
state action39 Based on the state action limitation, the Batson principle
has not been categorically applied in civil actions. In Clark, the court
applied Batson to civil cases only where the government violated equal
62 Id. at 761. The Edmonson court noted that Esposito did not "expressly decid[e] whether the exer-
cise of peremptory challenges in a civil case involves government action." Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 860 F.2d at 1314.
Esposito, 642 F. Supp at 761. In distinguishing Esposito the Clark court noted that "the plaintiff
was neither a member of a cognizable group.... nor was the burden with regard to a prima facie
case met by the plaintiff." Clark v. City of Bridgeport, 645 F. Supp. at 895 n.5.
" See Patton, supra note 7, at 928-29. Although the Edmonson court recognized that "[t]here are
manifest differences between the nature of a criminal prosecution and a civil action," Batson, the
court stated, was not "limited to the state's involvement in criminal prosecutions.' Edmonson, 860
F.2d at 1313.
65 71 Md. App. 681, 527 A.2d 332.
66 Id. at 690, 527 A.2d at 336-37. The Supreme Court could have limited Batson to criminal pro-
ceedings by analyzing the issue solely under the sixth amendment right to a fair trial. But the
Court applied the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and expressed "no view on the
merits of any of petitioner's sixth amendment arguments." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 85 n.4.
67 Chew, 71 Md. App. at 692, 527 A.2d at 338 (quoting Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 259 (1986)).
The relevant section of the federal Equal Protection Clause provides that no state shall "deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
6" The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
Summer, 1989]
7
Murdock: State Action or Inaction
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1990
protection in its use of peremptory challenges.0 Also, in King v. County
of Nassau,7 a United States district court judge expressed doubts that
a trial court's acceptance of a private litigant's suspect use of peremp-
tory challenges constituted state action.
The Chew court, however, suggested that "the very establishment
of a jury selection procedure may qualify as [s]tate action, regardless of
which party ultimately exercises the peremptory challenges in an alleged-
ly discriminatory fashion."72 Furthermore, commentators have stated that
if the benefits from applying equal protection to an activity would
outweigh the burdens that such a holding would entail, then a court is
more likely to find state action in that activity. 3 Therefore, whether state
action exists in a private litigant's exercise of peremptory challenges is
subject to debate.
ANALYSIS
The Edmonson court concluded that if the discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges to exclude prospective black jurors in criminal
cases violates equal protection, then the same procedure in civil cases
also violates equal protection. The court stated that "[r]acial prejudice
has no more place in the federal courtroom on the days the court is con-
ducting a civil trial than it does on the days when the same judge, seated
at the same bench, in the same courtroom, is conducting a criminal
trial' 7 4 But Edmonson involved private litigants: Batson could only apply
if there was state action. Although the Edmonson court found that state
action existed by private counsel's exercise of peremptory challenges in
federal court, the extension from a prosecutor in Batson to private counsel
in Edmonson is tenuous under the state action doctrine. The questionable
extension weakens the Edmonson holding. As an alternative, the fifth
circuit could have applied the Batson principle to the trial court through
its inherent supervisory powers.
Edmonson's Approach to State Action
In finding state action, the Edmonson court applied the two-prong
test announced in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Ca75: (1) whether the claimed
" Clark v. City of Bridgeport, 645 F. Supp. at 896.
71 581 F. Supp. 493, 499 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
12 Chew v. State, 71 Md. App. at 690, 527 A.2d at 337.
73 See Davis, supra note 8, at 1400. See also Note, State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional
Restrictions to Private Activity, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 656, 659-61 (1974).
14 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 860 F.2d at 1313-14.
75 457 U.S. at 937.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:1
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equal protection violation resulted from the exercise of a statutory right,
and (2) whether the private litigant might be characterized as a state
actor. The court satisfied the first prong by holding that the litigant's
use of peremptory challenges granted under 28 U.S.C. § 187076 is a
statutory right77 Under the facts in Edmonson, however, the second prong
of the Lugar test was not as straightforward. The court claimed to have
satisfied the second prong by reasoning that the private litigant's and
the trial judge's joint participation in the exercise of peremptory challenges
was sufficient to characterize the private litigant as a state actor 8 The
Edmonson court analogized their facts to the facts of Shelley v. Kraemer,79
Tulsa Professional Collection Services v. Pope,80 and Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority.8 In each of those cases, the Supreme Court found state
action.
In Shelley, the Court reasoned that the judicial enforcement of a
racially restrictive covenant involved state action. 2 If the state court had
enforced the covenant, through its coercive power, then the state would
have effectuated the discrimination. The Court focused on the state court
as state actor, not the private litigants?' In Edmonson, the trial court
was not asked to enforce anything, nor to use its coercive power; peremp-
tory challenges require only that the trial court excuse the challenged
juror.84
The Edmonson court stated that the "Court in Shelley recognized
that governmental action triggered by a private litigant retains its of-
ficial character."' 5 But many courts and commentators disagree with that
statement. 6 As one commentator stated: Shelley "did not hold that judicial
orders enforcing private decisions imbue [the] decision with sufficient
state action to review [it] as the acts of government."8 7
78 See 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1982). § 1870 provides: "In civil cases, each party shall be entitled to three
peremptory challenges." However, the right to peremptory challenges is not guaranteed by the Con-
stitution. See Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919).
17 Edmonson, 860 F.2d at 1312.
78 Id. at 1311.
71 334 U.S. 1. See supra note 14-26.
0 108 S.Ct. 1340. See supra note 14-26.
81 365 U.S. 715. See supra note 14-26.
82 Shelley, 334 U.S. at 23.
83 The Court stated: "It is clear that but for the active intervention of the state courts, supported
by the full panoply of state power, petitioners would have been free to occupy the properties in ques-
tion without restraint.' Id. at 19. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the restrictive covenants
standing alone were not violative of equal protection. Id.
84 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 860 F.2d at 1316 (Gee, J., dissenting).
85 Id at 1311.
See Henkin, Shelley u Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (1962). See,
eg, Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963) (one of five "sit-in" cases that did not rely
on Shelley under similar facts).
87 Glennon and Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State Action" Require-
ment, 1976 Sup. CT. REV. 221, 238.
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In Pope, the Court found state action where "private parties make
use of state procedures with the overt, significant assistance of state of-
ficials."88 Pope involved a state probate court's management of a nonclaim
statute.9 The Court distinguished the probate court's active management
of the nonclaim statute from an ordinary statute of limitations, where
there would be no state action?° However, a trial court's involvement in
the use of a peremptory challenge-excusing the challenged juror-seems
more related to a trial court's involvement in dismissing a claim because
the statute of limitations has run, rather than managing a nonclaim
statute?'
In Burton; the Court reversed a state court decision that had denied
a black patron access to a private restaurant, on state property, solely
on the basis of race?2 The Court found state action through the state's
lease agreement with the private restaurant, and its failure to include
in that agreement a non-discrimination clause?' The circumstantial
evidence in Burton suggested that the government benefited from ex-
cluding the clause; thus, "Burton can be understood as entailing an in-
ference of purposeful racial discrimination by government." 94 It is difficult
to ascertain any benefit the government would obtain from a private
litigant's discriminatory use of a peremptory challenge. Indeed, one com-
mentator has cautioned that the state action rationale in Burton should
not be extended beyond the particular facts of that case?5
The Edmonson court concluded, quoting People v. Gary M,98 that
"'the [s]tate is not merely an observer of the discrimination, but a signifi-
cant participant.. . The only thing the [sitate does not do is make the
88 Tulsa Professional Collection Serv. v. Pope, 108 S.Ct. at 1345.
9 Id. at 1345. The nonclaim statute in issue becomes operative only after court proceedings in which
the judge appoints an executor/executrix, directs the executor/executrix to notify creditors (who have
two months to file a claim), and requires the executor/executrix to file copies of the notice and an
affidavit of publication with the court. Id. at 1345-46.
" The Court stated that "the state's involvement in the mere running of a general statute of limita-
tion [was not] generally sufficient to implicate" the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 1345. See Texaco,
Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982).
91 In Pope, the Court noted that the trial court managed many activities necessary for implement-
ing the nonclaim statute. Pope, 108 S.Ct. at 1346. In regard to whether state action exists when
a court dismisses a claim because the statute of limitations has run, the Court in Pope stated that
"[t]he state has no role to play beyond enactment of the limitations period." Id. at 1345.
92 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. at 726.
'3 Id. at 718-20.
See TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 18-3, at 1701 n.13 (2d ed. 1988).
9' See Lewis, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority - A Case Without Precedent, 61 COLUM. L.
REV. 1458 (1961).
People v. Gary M., 138 Misc. 2d 1081, 526 N.Y.S.2d 986 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988).
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:1
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decision to discriminate.' "9' In Gary M., the prosecutor claimed that the
defendant had discriminately used his peremptory challenges; the trial
court agreed. The trial court found that the defendant was a state actor
because the state initiated the proceedings, the defense counsel was an
officer of the court, the challenges were made in open court, the state
granted the right to peremptory challenges, and the alleged discrimina-
tion was racial?' The similarity with Edmonson extends to the facts that
Leesville's counsel was an officer of the court;99 the government granted
the right to peremptory challenges; 100 and, the alleged discrimination
was racial0 1 None of these facts, however, seem pertinent to whether a
private litigant might be characterized as a state actor under the second
prong of Lugar.0 Under the facts in Edmonson, therefore, the private
litigant in conjunction with the trial judge cannot be fairly characteriz-
ed as a state actor.0 3
", Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 860 F.2d at 1312 (quoting Gary M., 138 Misc. 2d at __.,
526 N.Y.S.2d at 994.
98 Gary M., 138 Misc. 2d at _ , 526 N.Y.S.2d at 994.
,As the Edmonson dissent points out, however, if a state-employed public defender is not a state
actor as the Supreme Court held in Polk, then it seems clear that a private litigant's counsel is
not a state actor. Edmonson 860 F.2d at 1315-16 (Gee, J., dissenting). See supra note 34. See eg,
Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d 1256, modified and reh'g denied, 583 F.2d 779 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that
private counsel does not act under color of state law).
'00 See supra note 76. Furthermore, in Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978), the Court
held that the private use of state-sanctioned private procedures does not rise to the level of state action.
'The fact that the discrimination was racial does seem to have an effect on whether a court will
find state action, in general. See supra note 73. The Gary M. court concluded that "government
has been permitted fewer contacts with private actors engaged in racial discrimination than with
those otherwise acting in a manner which the government itself could not." Gary M., 138 Misc. 2d
at __ , 526 N.Y.S.2d at 993 (quoting Under 21 Catholic Home Bur. for Dependent Children v.
City of N.Y., 65 N.Y.2d 344, 363,482 N.E.2d 1, 10,492 N.Y.S.2d 522,531 (1985) ). The Gary M. court,
however, did "not decide whether under the Lugar test there is in this case 'state action.' " Id. n.9.
102 The second prong of the Lugar test states that "the party charged with the deprivation must
be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor, either because he is a state official, because
he has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state officials, or because his con-
duct is otherwise chargeable to the state." Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. at 923. "Without
a limit such as this;' the Court noted, "private parties could face constitutional litigation whenever
they seek to rely on some state rule governing their interactions with the community surrounding
them*' Id. at 937. Finally, in Lugar, the Court stated that "we do not hold today that 'a private
party's mere invocation of state legal procedures constitutes 'joint participation' or 'conspiracy' with
state officials:" because "[tihe holding today ... is limited to the particular context of prejudgment
attachment" Id. at 939 n. 21 (quoting in part from Justice Powell's dissenting opinion at 953). In-
voking a trial court's coercive power to attach property prior to judgment is distinguishable from
a private litigant's use of a peremptory challenge, whereby the trial court merely excuses the chal-
lenged juror.
103 As the Edmonson dissent noted, state action is normally only found where the government" 'has
exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement.., that the choice
must ... be deemed that of the state' and that '[m]ere approval of or acquiescence in the initiatives
of a private party is not sufficient to justify' " state action. Edmonson, 860 F.2d at 1316 (Gee, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. at 1004).
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An Alternative to Edmonson's Approach to State Action
In holding that the Batson principle applied in civil proceedings,
the Edmonson court implicitly interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 1870 as prohibiting
the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges,10 4 at least where there
was state action. Without state action, even with the Batson principle
implicit in the granting of peremptory challenges, Leesville's suspect use
of its peremptory challenges was beyond judicial inquiry. Thus, if Leesville
did discriminate, then the rights of the two excluded black jurors and
of the public, as announced in Batson,105 would be unenforceable!' In other
words, while the substance of equal protection would be violated, the form
of the violation would preclude enforcement. Consequently, if Leesville
did discriminate, then the excluded jurors and the public would be ag-
grieved without a judicial remedy.07 Under a federal appellate court's
inherent supervisory powers,10 8 however, the Edmonson court could have
applied the Batson principle to remedy such an equal protection viola-
tion, even though the Constitution did not specifically authorize the pro-
cedure.0 To apply Batson to a private litigant through the trial court
is not as tenuous as to characterize the same litigant a state actor.
Under the supervisory powers alternative, if a black litigant objects,
on the basis of race, to a white litigant's exercise of a peremptory
challenge,110 then the trial court must inquire into the reason for the
1" The Edmonson court stated that "[ilnterpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1870 to allow the exclusion of jurors
because of their race would condone conduct that could not be explicitly allowed.' Edmonson 860
F.2d at 1312. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (holding that a state constitutional amend-
ment that prohibited government interference in private discrimination was unconstitutional).
o See supra notes 56-57.
o Private discrimination, after all, is outside the reach of equal protection. See supra note 69.
107 But, as the Supreme Court stated in Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984), "[p]rivate biases
may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect."
... Supervisory powers lay on the premise that federal appellate "courts must be given the ability
to preserve the integrity of the judicial system.' United States v. Leslie, 783 F.2d 541, 569 (5th Cir.
1986) (Williams, J., dissenting). See also Note, The Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 76 HARv.
L. REV. 1656 (1963).
10 See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983). A purpose of supervisory powers is "to
implement a remedy for violation of recognized rights." Id. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332 (1943). See supra notes. 56-57. Furthermore, "[tihe supervisory power is often exercised to pre-
vent or correct injustice where existing procedures have proved inadequate. In many cases, the pro-
blem could have been solved without resort to supervisory power but frequently only by distorting
traditional legal doctrines.' Note, The Judge-Made Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 53 GEO.
L.J. 1050, 1078 (1965).
1o In effect, the black litigant could act as an agent for the excluded juror, requiring the trial court
to recognize the excluded juror's right. See National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States,
372 U.S. 246 (1963). See also People v. Gary M., 138 Misc. 2d at __, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 995. But,
see supra note 111.
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strikeP1 By objecting, the black litigant invokes the Batson principle that,
as the fifth circuit held, was implicit in 28 U.S.C. § 1870.2 Otherwise,
if the judge were to permit the suspect strike without question and ex-
cuse the juror, then the trial court would condone possible discrimina-
tion and, if the black litigant's allegation were true, violate the recognized
rights of the excluded juror and of the public. As the Edmonson court
stated, "the remedy is not to condone [racially motivated challenges] but
to insist, when objection is made, that the guarantee of equal protection
against all racial prejudice is enforced."' 1 3
In applying Batson to civil proceedings, the Clark court concluded
that it was within the court's "inherent supervisory power to protect the
right of the excluded jurors, as well as to preserve the integrity of this
[clourt and the judicial process." 14 In Thiel v. Southern Pacific Ca ," the
Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision to deny a motion to
strike the jury panel in a civil case. The empaneled jury did not repre-
sent a fair cross-section of the community."s In reversing the decision,
the Court exercised its "power of supervision over the administration of
justice in the federal courts."' 7
Prior to Batson, the fifth circuit in panel in United States u Leslie"'
invoked its supervisory powers to limit a prosecutor's discriminatory use
of peremptory challenges.P9 Under Leslie, the fifth circuit reasoned that
the public would not tolerate federal officers who racially discriminated
in federal court. 20 Also, the court reasoned that the exclusion of prospec-
"' The Gary M. court noted that the state (in this case the trial court) "has standing to assert the
equal protection claims of the excluded jurors under the doctrine ofjus tertii or third-party stand-
ing." Gary M., 138 Misc 2d at __ , 526 N.Y.S.2d at 995. See also Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S.
106 (1976). Although, under the supervisory powers alternative, standing is not an issue. However,
the issue might arise as a policy consideration in upholding the equal protection rights of the ex-
cluded juror and of the public over the litigant's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. See
supra note 6. The Gary M. court did "not decide whether it can entertain this claim under its super-
visory power." Gary M, 138 Misc. 2d at __, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 996 n.12.
112 See supra note 104.
113 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 860 F.2d at 1314 (emphasis added).
"'Clark v. City of Bridgeport, 645 F. Supp. at 897.
115 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
"I The Court stated that "[tihe American tradition of trial by jury, considered in connection with
either criminal or civil proceedings, necessarily contemplates an impartial jury drawn from a cross-
section of the community.' Id. at 220. Similar reasoning has been applied to the limited use of peremp-
tory challenges in civil proceedings. See eg, Patton, supra note 7, at 930-32.
"' Thiel, 328 U.S. at 225.
1 United States v. Leslie, 759 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1985).
1 "In the exercise of our supervisory power and in the interest of justice, therefore, we conclude
that the federal prosecutor's precious, though not absolute, right to employ peremptory challenges
without review must yield in those cases where the defendant can establish that the prosecutor
misused those challenges and engaged in invidious racial discrimination.' Id. at 374.
Id. at 373. See also Patton, supra note 7, at 944.
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tive black jurors erodes public confidence in the judicial system, under-
mines judicial integrity, and is manifestly unfair. 2  However, on rehear-
ing en banc, the fifth circuit reversed the panel's holding as-violative of
Swain, and stated that supervisory powers should not be invoked to alter
existing law unless recognized rights have been violated.22 But as the
New Jersey Supreme Court commented: "Batson for all practical pur-
poses reinstates the panel's holding."' 23
If Edmonson is overturned for lack of state action, then the recog-
nized rights of jurors excluded because of race, and of the public who could
have witnessed the discrimination, would be illusory in civil proceedings
between private litigants. But, in all civil proceedings, as in all criminal
proceedings, the trial court, not the parties, empanel and then excuse
challenged jurors. Although the trial court's involvement might not be
state action, it might, nonetheless, appear to condone discrimination. As
the fifth circuit stated: "Ulustice would indeed be blind if it failed to
recognize that the federal court is employed as a vehicle for racial
discrimination when peremptory challenges are used to exclude jurors
because of their race."' 24 The Batson principle applied to the trial court,
through an appellate court's supervisory powers, would reach all civil
proceedings and avoid the tenuous state action extension in Edmonson.
CONCLUSION
Edmonson applied the Batson principal-judicial inquiry into the
suspect use of peremptory challenges-to civil proceedings between private
litigants via the equal protection clause. In so doing, the fifth circuit had
to find, and ostensively did find, state action in a private litigant's use
of peremptory challenges. But the fifth circuit's rationale in finding state
action was too tenuous to support the Edmonson holding.
Batson recognized three parties aggrieved by the discriminatory use
of peremptory challenges. Two of the parties-the excluded black juror
and the public-are likewise aggrieved by the discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges in civil proceedings, whether the state is the party
who allegedly discriminated or not. To assure justice, therefore, the trial
court must require a racially neutral reason before excusing a prospec-
tive black juror. Batson held as much; Edmonson applied the require-
ment to civil proceedings between private litigants to further the
121 Id.
122 United States v. Leslie, 783 F.2d at 566 (en banc).
123 State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508, 521, 511 A.2d 1150, 1156 n.1 (1986).
124 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 860 F.2d at 1313.
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assurance of justice. To frame such a requirement in an illusive doctrine
like state action, however, seems unnecessary when a more viable alter-
native is available. This note offers a supervisory powers alternative to
Edmonson's extension of state action. Under the alternative, the fifth cir-
cuit could have applied Batson, through its authority to formulate trial
procedure, to the private litigants in Edmonson-with or without state
action. Thus, if a private litigant makes a Batson-type objection, then
the trial court, as part of its pretrial procedure, would inquire into the
reason for the strike and deny the strike if it was racially motivated. Such
a procedure is the substance of the Edmonson holding, absent the for-
mal baggage of state action.
CHAD MURDOCK
15
Murdock: State Action or Inaction
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1990
16
Akron Law Review, Vol. 23 [1990], Iss. 1, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol23/iss1/5
